Nosemonkey's EUtopia

June 26, 2008
by Nosemonkey
1 Comment

Habermas and the EU

Nanne highlights a piece by the man who must surely now be Europe’s last great public intellectual, Jurgen Habermas (let’s face it, most of the rest are dead now… Not that Habermas wouldn’t deserve a place in the top five or ten of the last 40 years anyway, but still – where’s the next generation, eh?).

Thankfully it’s in English – and Habermas is always worth a read when he’s being topical, because he’s got an uncanny knack for spotting trends and problems that others miss, as well as being able to say things bluntly that would label lesser-known figures as raving eurosceptics. He is, however, more often than not spot-on, as this piece written back in 2001 (amply predicting all the problems the EU has faced in the years following the Treaty of Nice) and this from last year (on the challenges for the EU at 50) both amply demonstrate.

At any rate, Habermas is at once scathing and constructive in his criticism:

After the failure of the proposed European constitution in 2005, the Lisbon Treaty represented a bureaucratically negotiated compromise to be pushed through behind the backs of the citizenry. With this most recent tour de force, European governments have callously demonstrated that they alone are shaping Europe’s future…

The failed referendums are a signal that the elitist mode of European unification is, thanks to its own success, reaching its limits. These limits can only be surmounted if the pro-European elites stop excusing themselves from the principle of representation and shed their fears of contact with the electorate…

Naturally, the fundamental conflict over direction derives its explosive force from deeper-seated, historically-rooted differences. There are not grounds for criticism of any particular country. But in the wake of the Irish signal, we should expect two things from our governments. They must admit that they are at their wits’ end. And they cannot continue to suppress their crippling dissent. In the end, they are left with no choice but to allow the peoples to decide for themselves…

With luck and commitment, a two-speed Europe could emerge from such a vote

All quite familiar stuff, perhaps (much of his suggestions covered here over the last few years) – but it’s not what’s said so much as who’s saying it. Habermas may not always be right (indeed, he’s long been a vehement supporter of a common European foreign policy, something I still reckon to be unworkable for the forseeable future), but he is consistent and, most importantly, considered.

Who, after all, are mere gadfly politicians – in office for but a few years and rarely the sharpest tools in the box – to ignore the advice of one of the foremost political theorists of the late 20th century, one who has been studying this very problem for decades? With his specialism the study of communication, pragmatic compromise and understanding – precisely the things the EU is supposed to promote between nations – Habermas should be one of the first ports of call for ideas on how to proceed… After all, what is the EU if not an attempt to spread universal pragmatics across an entire continent?

But such is the nature of these things. Increasingly politicians get into office unarmed with a knowledge of history and philosophy that was once thought vital for offices of state. Little wonder we’re in such trouble…

(On which note, perhaps it’s time for me to start that series of posts on little-known and forgotten aspects, incidents and people of European history that I’ve been meaning to do for a while now?)

June 26, 2008
by Nosemonkey
Comments Off on More ways forward: John Vincour

More ways forward: John Vincour

Still trawling through post-Lisbon reactions and catching up with the various pieces of differing, trying to absorb as many suggestions as possible.

Via Certain Ideas of Europe I find John Vincour’s interesting take in the IHT, which makes some very good points – not least in agreeing with my ongoing contention that securing a reliable supply of energy to the continent should be acknowledged as one of the EU’s biggest concerns. He’s against my pet favourite solution of a multi-speed Europe – but for an eminently sensible reason, and with a possibly workable alternative proposal.

One of the best articles I’ve seen so far, and well worth reading in full.

June 25, 2008
by Nosemonkey
7 Comments

Seconded

Jon Worth on the futility of being an EU-focussed blogger.

The only thing I’d say he’s missed is that the EU is also insanely boring, which makes getting up the motivation to write about it even more tricky than the minute readership and constant feeling that your few good ideas are being nicked by people who are then getting paid for it…

Of course, the plus side is that a small readership of people who know their stuff or will intelligently engage (hello, dear readers, etc.) is infinitely preferable to a large readership of idiots. In professional journalism you always end up writing for the audience you’ve got (for example, just last week I ended up using the phrase “gossip-fest” in the headline of a piece I was working on – not something you’d normally see here…).

The point of blogging, I always thought, is to write to the audience you want. Want a large one? Saying remotely positive things about the EU – if you’re writing in English in particular – simply isn’t the way to go. Instead you need populist conspiracy theories, knee-jerk politician-bashing, and plenty of rumour and innuendo. Just be prepared for a flood of comments from nutters. Want an influential one? Be thoughtful and original. Just don’t expect a great deal of credit – and don’t expect to be able to tell whether you’re influential or not half the time…

June 25, 2008
by Nosemonkey
Comments Off on Spotted elsewhere

Spotted elsewhere

Catching up on various blogs (and as part of my drive to post more frequently here, even if they are shorter pieces), a couple of interesting pieces from Cicero’s Songs – seemingly one of the few left(ish) liberal British political bloggers to have noticed the Irish Lisbon Treaty referendum result (perhaps because left(ish) liberal British political bloggers rarely seem to notice the EU – a bit of an elephant in the room, than…). In any case, both posts are well worth a read, whether you agree with them or not:

Where does the EU go from here?
“To my mind, the problem remains one of identity and legitimacy. The European Union has failed to justify, or even explain, its purpose… The EU used to define its purpose as creating ‘an ever closer union’ – in other words it had an open-ended commitment to increasing its role and the scope of its activities. The time has come for the EU to do the reverse and set the limits of its activities.”

Outvoting democracy
“As a Liberal commentary this blog believes that setting the limits to state power is a fundamental basis of freedom. The EU has been trying to change tack from ‘ever closer union’ towards more limited policy goals for some time. However the compromises embedded in the Constitutional treaty and the Lisbon treaty are simply too many and too complicated. The idea of comprehensive reform must be shelved- we can not bring either the majority of the states or the majority of the population to agreement at this point- and it is dangerous to try.

“The EU can only reconnect with the citizen if it can demonstrate that it serves a valuable purpose. Instead of the high-falutin’ words of Giscard d’Estaing’s Federalism, we should return to the practical usefulness of Functionalism.”

June 24, 2008
by Nosemonkey
15 Comments

EU problems and priorities

A few more post-Irish Referendum thoughts – because the EU really, really needs to know what it is that it should be doing if it’s to work out what is the best way forward from its ongoing Constitutional/Lisbon Treaty navel-gazing. More suggestions for priorities gratefully received in the comments.

Two starting assumptions for this list:

1) Institutional reform remains necessary (largely thanks to the short-sightedness of the earlier treaties: it is, after all, entirely possible to have rules for a club of 6 or 15 that also work for a club of 27 – it’s just that the people drawing up those rules made them inflexible), but it’s not essential for the EU to continue to function

2) Neither the Lisbon Treaty nor the Constitution really dealt with what I see as the EU’s two biggest problems (the Common Agricultural Project and the dominance of Russia in the continent’s energy supply) anyway

So, on with a few vague thoughts on the main problems and priorities, in approximate order of importance: Continue Reading →

June 20, 2008
by Nosemonkey
6 Comments

The Lisbon Treaty: Why so unpopular?

It’s the single most important question – because without an answer, how can the EU progress? Brian Barder has a good stab at providing an answer – well worth reading in full:

most of the sentiments, worries and concerns contributing to the No vote in the referendum are widely shared in many other EU countries; few are unique to Ireland, and those that are probably have similar counterparts elsewhere in the EU. The people of some EU countries differ from the Irish in exhibiting a high level of antipathy to the whole European project: the UK is certainly one of these, and some of the new eastern and central European countries (and/or their leaders) are others. Even those who are generally pro-European are often critical of the lack of transparency of many of the processes of the EU, of the centripetal tendencies of the Commission, of the failure to clean up the Union’s finances, of what is rather vaguely referred to as the democratic deficit. All such tendencies will tend to predispose a goodly number of individual European voters to vote No in a referendum on almost any proposition recommended to them by their political leaders, however intrinsically innocuous.

The only trouble with all this is, of course, that the “why” ends up complicating the issue yet further. Rather than being merely an Irish problem, or merely a European one, the Irish “no” ends up due to global concerns – and, let’s face it, what isn’t a global issue these days?

This makes the “No” problem far harder to solve, for sure. But it also surely helps underscore just how ineffective individual nation states have become at dealing with problems that are increasingly global in scale. Strength in numbers sounds like an ever safer bet the more the economy suffers jitters and the more that globalisation continues.

This is something that the whole EU can, with any luck, start to get behind – because it’s the whole reason that pretty much every member state joined in the first place. Its the economy, stupid – and I’d say it’s about time the various leaders of the various EU member states began to remember that. The fancy bits and high ideals can come later – the first step is to bolster the economic base. That was the initial aim of the European Project, after all. The EU should remember that it needs to learn to walk before it tries sprinting…

Note: This is another in an apparently ongoing series of occasional posts where I’m effectively thinking out loud. I’ll have changed my mind again in a couple of hours, most likely…

June 16, 2008
by Nosemonkey
11 Comments

More Irish referendum aftermath thoughts

First up, Nanne’s done a handy roundup of blog reactions (with a few more from RZ) – which further goes to show that there’s no real consensus on what the hell should be done. Some more fervent pro-EU types are adopting the “sod the Irish” approach of continuing ratification and booting Ireland out of the EU if they don’t follow along like a well-trained dog. Some anti-EU types are revelling in the red faces in Brussels and calling for the whole thing to be scrapped again because (obviously) a no vote in a referendum means that every single person voting no did so because they hate the EU and everything it stands for. Neither extreme, fairly obviously, is a sensible option.

Me? I’m still at the stage of thinking out loud, so to speak – reading and writing helps me to work out what I think about things, which is why I started blogging in the first place. I’m still not sure if I’m getting anywhere on the short-term solution. Longer-term I have a far firmer idea of what I’d like to see done – but the likelihood of that coming to pass is minimal, so I’ll leave it for now.

Having read a lot of stuff about the vote over the weekend, the best comment piece I’ve seen so far comes – as so often – from the Financial Times. This quotation is somewhat selective, but gives an inkling of what’s becoming my approach:

First the French, then the Dutch and now the Irish have rejected much the same package of institutional reforms that were supposed to make an enlarged EU more effective and more democratic… Their attitude suggests a worrying gulf between EU decision-makers and popular feeling that needs a new sort of response… The No vote[s were] based on a ragbag of reasons to which there is no obvious response.”

In the FT’s take, a repeat referendum would likewise return a “No” – and I imagine the same would be the case in France and the Netherlands had they been given a chance to vote on the Lisbon Treaty as they were on the Constitution. The anger in France at the two fingers the politicians raised to the people by denying them another vote on a treaty that was so similar to a text that had already been popularly rejected is immense. Who can blame them?

Because the biggest problem facing the EU now is not the much-needed institutional reforms that Lisbon (and the constitution, and Nice) was trying to fix to help the thing function more effectively – it is that the people of Europe are increasingly starting to think that there may well be something in all those allegations of the EU being an undemocratic project of the quasi-mythical political elites for the benefit of those same elites. And you can hardly blame them – French and Dutch “No” votes have already been ignored, the Danish and Irish people have already been told to vote again when they returned the wrong result the first time, and now it looks like the inconvenience of the Irish people voting “No” again is going to lead to some kind of get-around. It’s hard to think of the last time the people of Europe were consulted and their opinions actually taken on board. In fact, I can’t think of a time this has happened – bar the odd small-scale experiment as part of the Plan D initiative over the last couple of years.

Does it matter that on numbers alone the “No” voters in Ireland are a tiny percentage of the EU’s population as a whole? Not while the rest of that population doesn’t get a vote it doesn’t – as pointed out elsewhere, so what if “only” 860,000 Irish voted “No” when the rest of the EU denies the people a vote and leaves the decision up to a mere 9,000-odd politicians? And what does it matter while the EU continues to function with its current set-up, with smaller countries given disproportionate influence to counter the dominance of those with larger populations? The Lisbon Treaty aimed to fix some of the more silly elements of this, but Maltese MEPs would continue to represent 80,000 Maltese compared to German MEPs representing 800,000 Germans – and in many areas the national veto would still have been maintained. Because part of the very point of the EU is to prevent the larger, stronger countries from dominating the continent. To ignore Ireland’s vote is therefore to go against the very essence of what the EU was set up to achieve.

(Please also note that I say all this as someone who argued repeatedly against holding referenda on the constitution and Lisbon treaty. Contradictory? Possibly – but if you hold votes you’d damned well better abide by the results. If not, the people will tend to get increasingly annoyed with you. It’s bad public relations as much as it’s bad democracy.)

In any case, the FT’s proposal for the next step is one of the least contentious I’ve seen so far, and (I hope) the most likely short-term outcome:

It would be more sensible to put the Lisbon treaty on ice for several years, and try to rescue those parts that are important, uncontentious, and capable of being carried out without treaty amendment… Europe does not need to turn the drama of the Irish No vote into a fully-fledged crisis of confidence. Everyone is fed up with negotiating new treaties. The priority should be to make the EU work better with practical policies… with its present rules and 27 member states. The Nice treaty is not ideal, but losing Lisbon should not be seen as the end of the world.

Calm-headedness is the way forward, for sure. But, as I say, the institutional problems are no longer the most pressing. What is needed now more than ever is an energetic campaign to get the people of Europe on board. Mere propaganda drives will not do it – they need to be brought into the debate and made to feel that their voices count. Because currently – with the European Parliament still largely toothless and the French, Dutch and Irish referendum results all more or less dismissed by the powers that be – you can hardly blame people for feeling that in the EU, the people count for nothing.

June 14, 2008
by Nosemonkey
8 Comments

Lessons from America for the EU

In the wake of the Irish rejection of the Lisbon Treaty, I hope that the reason for my quoting the following passage from James Bryce‘s seminal The American Commonwealth is obvious.

This passage outlines, in part, what I envisage when I think of what the EU should be, even though it is talking of the United States of the late 19th century – and it is furthermore an essential lesson from history for the EU as whole (from the individual citizen to the highest of the political elites) to take on board. These words may well have been written well over a century ago, and America may well have changed substantially since they were first committed to paper (Bryce’s book was first published in 1888, after all) – but they still stand.

As I say, I hope the intention of this extended quotation is obvious. If not, I will of course try to elaborate soon. But, in short, I firmly believe that – despite its flaws – the constitution (small “C”) of the United States of America is still the best model for creating a true European union (small “U”).

That old bogeyman of “the United States of Europe” is still all too often based on a misunderstanding. Working together but independent, independent but united is not an impossible dream – it has been done before. The flaw of the European project has always been in attempting to create – artificially and on too short a timescale – something that in America evolved more organically. And not just in America – almost all countries with a history of more than a couple of hundred years were once divided, from Britain and France through Germany, Spain, the Netherlands, Italy, Russia, China, Japan and on and on…

The same can be true for Europe – though I do not expect to see it in my lifetime or yours. Rome wasn’t built in a day – and the Treaty of Rome was never going to build a truly united Europe in a mere half century. It is high time that those with the power to influence the course of the European project came to realise that.

Anyway, on with the passage, from Volume I, Part I, Chapter II:

Some years ago the American Protestant Episcopal Church was occupied at its triennial convention in revising its liturgy. It was thought desirable to introduce among the short sentence prayers a prayer for the whole people; and an eminent New England divine proposed the words “O Lord, bless our nation.” Accepted one afternoon on the spur of the moment, the sentence was brought up next day for reconsideration, when so many objections were raised by the laity to the word “nation,” as importing too definite a recognition of national unity, that it was dropped, and instead there were adopted the words “O Lord, bless these United States.”

To Europeans who are struck by the patriotism and demonstrative national pride of their transatlantic visitors, this fear of admitting that the American people constitute a nation seems extraordinary. But it is only the expression on its sentimental side of the most striking and pervading characteristic of the political system of the country, the existence of a double government, a double allegiance, a double patriotism. America—I call it America (leaving out of sight South America, Canada, and Mexico), in order to avoid using at this stage the term United States—America is a commonwealth of commonwealths, a republic of republics, a state which, while one, is nevertheless composed of other states even more essential to its existence than it is to theirs.

This is a point of so much consequence, and so apt to be misapprehended by Europeans, that a few sentences may be given to it.

When within a large political community smaller communities are found existing, the relation of the smaller to the larger usually appears in one or other of the two following forms. One form is that of a league, in which a number of political bodies, be they monarchies or republics, are bound together so as to constitute for certain purposes, and especially for the purpose of common defence, a single body. The members of such a composite body or league are not individual men but communities. It exists only as an aggregate of communities, and will therefore vanish so soon as the communities which compose it separate themselves from one another. Moreover it deals with and acts upon these communities only. With the individual citizen it has nothing to do, no right of taxing him, or judging him, or making laws for him, for in all these matters it is to his own community that the allegiance of the citizen is due. A familiar instance of this form is to be found in the Germanic Confederation as it existed from 1815 till 1866. The Hanseatic League in mediæval Germany, the Swiss Confederation down till the present century, are other examples.

In the second form, the smaller communities are mere subdivisions of that greater one which we call the nation. They have been created, or at any rate they exist, for administrative purposes only. Such powers as they possess are powers delegated by the nation, and can be overridden by its will. The nation acts directly by its own officers, not merely on the communities, but upon every single citizen; and the nation, because it is independent of these communities, would continue to exist were they all to disappear. Examples of such minor communities may be found in the departments of modern France and the counties of modern England. Some of the English counties were at one time, like Kent or Dorset, independent kingdoms or tribal districts; some, like Bedfordshire, were artificial divisions from the first. All are now merely local administrative areas, the powers of whose local authorities have been delegated from the national government of England. The national government does not stand by virtue of them, does not need them. They might all be abolished or turned into wholly different communities without seriously affecting its structure.

The American federal republic corresponds to neither of these two forms, but may be said to stand between them. Its central or national government is not a mere league, for it does not wholly depend on the component communities which we call the states. It is itself a commonwealth as well as a union of commonwealths, because it claims directly the obedience of every citizen, and acts immediately upon him through its courts and executive officers. Still less are the minor communities, the states, mere subdivisions of the Union, mere creatures of the national government, like the counties of England or the departments of France. They have over their citizens an authority which is their own, and not delegated by the central government. They have not been called into being by that government. They—that is, the older ones among them—existed before it. They could exist without it.

The central or national government and the state governments may be compared to a large building and a set of smaller buildings standing on the same ground, yet distinct from each other. It is a combination sometimes seen where a great church has been erected over more ancient homes of worship. First the soil is covered by a number of small shrines and chapels, built at different times and in different styles of architecture, each complete in itself. Then over them and including them all in its spacious fabric there is reared a new pile with its own loftier roof, its own walls, which may perhaps rest on and incorporate the walls of the older shrines, its own internal plan.1 The identity of the earlier buildings has however not been obliterated; and if the later and larger structure were to disappear, a little repair would enable them to keep out wind and weather, and be again what they once were, distinct and separate edifices. So the American states are now all inside the Union, and have all become subordinate to it. Yet the Union is more than an aggregate of states, and the states are more than parts of the Union. It might be destroyed, and they, adding a few further attributes of power to those they now possess, might survive as independent self-governing communities.

This is the cause of that immense complexity which startles and at first bewilders the student of American institutions, a complexity which makes American history and current American politics so difficult to the European who finds in them phenomena to which his own experience supplies no parallel. There are two loyalties, two patriotisms; and the lesser patriotism, as the incident in the Episcopal convention shows, is jealous of the greater. There are two governments, covering the same ground, commanding, with equally direct authority, the obedience of the same citizen.

The casual reader of American political intelligence in European newspapers is not struck by this phenomenon, because state politics and state affairs generally are seldom noticed in Europe. Even the traveller who visits America does not realize its importance, because the things that meet his eye are superficially similar all over the continent, and that which Europeans call the machinery of government is in America conspicuous chiefly by its absence. But a due comprehension of this double organization is the first and indispensable step to the comprehension of American institutions: as the elaborate devices whereby the two systems of government are kept from clashing are the most curious subject of study which those institutions present.

June 13, 2008
by Nosemonkey
13 Comments

The Lisbon Treaty is dead

But considering it was largely the unconvincing zombie resurrection of the old Constitution anyway, it probably won’t be fully dead until someone’s cut its head off, put a stake through its heart, shot it repeatedly with silver bullets, smothered it in garlic-infused holy water, and tricked it into saying its name backwards three times.

Note to the EU: for Christ’s sake, can we please actually THINK about the next step this time? In detail? Preferably without the assumption that the people are too stupid to notice what you’re trying to pull on them (thus alienating them yet further from a project which seems increasingly separated from the needs of the European people) – and ideally with the people in full, genuine consultation at every stage.

The continent of Europe is far, far too diverse for such idealistic “one size fits all” projects to have any place in future EU planning – unless it’s the most basic statement of shared ideals and principles, along the lines of the American declaration of independence or the US constitution. Surely that much is obvious? Just like the American colonies – only far, far more so – Europe is not made up of one united people; we are many peoples with much shared history and culture, but with plenty that also divides us in terms of hopes, dreams and aspirations. The old Constitution, the Lisbon Treaty – hell, pretty much every EU and EEC treaty ever ratified – failed sufficiently to acknowledge this, and so failed to allay concerns. The longer this went on – especially as the EU’s power and presence seemed to continue to grow without so much as a by your leave from a democratic vote – the more annoyed, the more distrustful the people of Europe were bound to become.

The European project was started by political elites as a trade association with delusions of grandeur. It is now much, much more than that, with competence creep after competence creep. It is too unwieldy and unaccountable for the people of a continent with more than its fair experience of despotism and dictatorship not to start taking offence if it continues down the route of “what we say goes, and there’s not much you can do about it”.

I believe in the principles behind the European Union. I believe that the European Union has done far, far more good than harm both in Europe itself and worldwide. I believe that the European Union should continue. But not in the direction it is currently heading. Not with the attitude it has currently got.

The Lisbon Treaty is dead – don’t make the same mistake as last time of trying to dress up the corpse to make it look a bit different. Accept the fundamental failure of the treaty (and constitution), and accept that a far more radical solution is vital. A complete rethink. A deep, serious analysis of what the EU is and what it is for – and, most importantly, what the European people think it is for. This is something that hasn’t happened in decades, but that is absolutely essential if the EU is to avoid the further alienation of its citzens – citizens who, it should be noted, have not all been asked if they want such citizenship in the first place.

The EU has evolved gradually over the years based on vague dreams. It’s time for a reality check.

(BBC story on initial reports of the lost Irish referendum here)

Update: As the count’s not final yet (this post was written at around 15:30 UK time), keep an eye on the Irish Times’ Lisbon Treaty site, with real-time updates. The current tally is 46.3% yes, 53.7% no. Elsewhere I’ve seen turnouts estimated at 40-45% – not huge, but not bad for EU-related elections, and more than the last Irish rejection of a European treaty back in 2001, even if the margin of rejection seems to be smaller this time…

June 13, 2008
by Nosemonkey
3 Comments

On the Shadow Home Secretary’s resignation

Three thoughts on all the Westminster excitement (for non-UK readers, the short version – the Shadow Home Secretary has resigned his seat as MP to force a by-election, which he has announced that he intends to fight on the single issue of the erosion of civil liberties in Britain, following the contentious and close vote to extend the legal period of detention without trial to 42 days):

1) No one (outside of blogland) really cares about a bunch of muslims being locked up (and no one outside of blogland thinks the risk of anyone other than terrorist suspects being affected is a serious one). Nor do they care much about ID cards and a national ID database, or about there being loads of CCTV cameras invading our privacy every second of the day with no discernible impact on crime rates (the “if you’ve done nothing wrong you’ve got nothing to hide” mentality still being massively dominant) when their house price is plummeting and/or it’s costing more to fill up at the pumps and do the weekly shop. The next election will almost certainly be fought over the economy, with Gordon Brown’s ten years as Chancellor being painted as ten years of luck that set us up for a crash by the Tories, and as ten years of stability showing Gordon Brown to be the best man to weather the economic storm by Labour. Civil Liberties are simply not an election-winning issue.

2) This is aimed at Cameron far more than Labour, and smacks of sour grapes that Davis hasn’t got the influence within the party to make this a central plank of the Tory attack strategy. He’s throwing his toys out of the pram, because two-time leadership loser Davis can’t hack that he’s not the boss. He almost certainly does believe (pretty much) everything he says on the civil liberties front – he’s got a decent enough track record, (though his support of 28 days does raise a few questions and contradictory positions on gay rights do cause some concern) – but it’s hard not to see this as anything more than another internal Tory party spat.

3) It is, however, moderately interesting that one of the most senior opposition frontbenchers sees parliament’s influence as so diminished that it’s easier to spread his message (pretty much literally) from a soapbox. Maybe someone should get the man a blog…

(Far more interesting, of course, is the result of the Irish Lisbon Treaty referendum – expected later today, and expected to be very close indeed. But will there be any irregularities that may allow a legal challenge from the losing side?)

June 11, 2008
by Nosemonkey
Comments Off on So much for UKIP being libertarians…

So much for UKIP being libertarians…

Their only MP – Tory defector Bob Spink – voted with the government this evening to extend detention without trial to 42 days.

Way to fight for our age-old freedoms, hypocritical right-wing dudes!

June 6, 2008
by Nosemonkey
2 Comments

Sorry for lack of posting (again)

Real world work busy. Combined with GTA IV in the limited downtime. No time for anything else, for the last few weeks I’m afraid.

(Strange discovery yesterday – when I see New York in films or on the telly now, I don’t think “New York”, I think “Oh, Liberty City – I ran over a bunch of people there after stealing that bus. Happy times!” Does this make me odd?)

I shall try to post a bit more over the next few weeks – the Irish referendum is starting to look genuinely interesting, and will be swiftly followed by the French presidency of the EU. Could prove to be an interesting few months. (Which is more than can be said for the last few…)

June 6, 2008
by Nosemonkey
9 Comments

What is the EU for?

Is the Lisbon Treaty finished? Well, if you have a gander at the latest poll of voting intentions in the Irish referendum on the thing, then yes. Because it can’t be passed without unanimous support from all 27 member states, and if the Irish people vote no, it has to be rethought and redrawn. Again.

Only 30% for the yes camp, with 35% in the no – and rapidly rising. Doesn’t look good for the pro-treaty brigade, does it? And all this from the Celtic tiger – one of the poorest European countries before joining what is now the EU, now one of the wealthiest. There’s gratitude for you!*

But the real revelation of this poll? It confirms something I’ve always maintained about a referendum for such a complex international treaty:

The reason most often cited by No voters is that they don’t know what they are voting for or they don’t understand the treaty – with 30 per cent of No voters listing this as the main reason for their decision

If you don’t understand something, don’t vote for it strikes me as an eminently sensible policy.

And herein lies the EU’s biggest flaw – as I’ve repeatedly stated here and elsewhere for years, the EU is far too complex to understand. Simplification is the key – and a constitution of sorts was the perfect opportunity to simplify. A few basic principles – nothing horrific. And what did they do? Churn out an incomprehensibly thick document full of meaningless subclauses and vague platitudes in an attempt to minimise dissent, ensuring that no one – not even those involved in drafting the thing – could agree on what it was actually setting out to do.

But even drawing up a simple, US-style constitution of a minimal number of first principles isn’t as simple as it sounds. An EU promoting free trade? You’ll be opposed by those wanting a “Social Europe”. Human rights sound like a nice thing to get behind, right? Well, it depends whose human rights – and whether you can agree to lump the basics of “don’t torture people” in with the more contentious “right” to taxpayer-funded benefits.

The Irish people don’t know what the Lisbon Treaty is all about? Little wonder when even the member states can’t agree what the EU itself is about.

This is the central problem with which the EU has been trying to come to terms since the end of the Cold War. It is the problem the Treaty of Nice was supposed to address, then the Constitution, and now Lisbon. And they still haven’t got an answer to the fundamental questions: what is the EU for?

* Note: Yes, I am fully aware that the Irish economic miracle cannot be put solely down to its membership of the EEC/EU – but you’d surely have to be somewhat ideologically blinkered to deny that membership had any part to play in Ireland’s success.

May 25, 2008
by Nosemonkey
Comments Off on Iraq and the need for the left to move on

Iraq and the need for the left to move on

(Originally published on The Sharpener)

The Euston Manifesto, officially launched today, proclaims itself as a way forward for “the left” – and is again defended by one of its writers, blogger and Manchester University Professor Norman Geras, over on the Guardian’s website.

Fine – a laudable aim. The British left has needed a way forward ever since the gang of four split the Labour party, a problem only compounded by the fall of the Soviet Union and Tony Blair’s careful guidance of the party towards the centre ground. The British left has to seriously reconsider its approach to the promotion of socialist ideals, and to what parts of the old left-wing obsessions are likely to be acceptable to the electorate in this post-Thatcherite age of rampant capitalism.

Obsessing over the Iraq war achieves none of this. M’colleague Garry has covered one part of the problem, but there’s another, broader one: the Iraq war is an irrelevance to the left’s attempts to revitalise itself after a quarter of a century of what amounts to a repeated defeat of left-wing ideology in successive British elections. It is an irrelevance to what the drafters of the Euston Manifesto profess to be their main aim.

Was Ken Livingstone elected Mayor of London first time around because he’s a socialist? Bollocks – it’s because we all knew it would piss Tony Blair off, and the candidates from the other two main parties were crap. Was George Galloway elected at the last general election because he was a socialist? Likewise bollocks – that was about the Iraq war and the government’s response to terrorism, not his economic beliefs.

This is the real crisis of the British left, not Iraq: the irrelevance of socialism to the modern political system. On the economic front, the right has won, and the left has little chance of a resurgence.

So where to next? Is the launch of a manifesto seemingly based on the Bartlet Doctrine from the fictional West Wing President’s second inaugural address seriously the best the British left can come up with – a wishy-washy, well-meaning but utterly impractical belief in international humanitarian interventionism? What about domestic policy? What about left-wing strategies for helping the poor of THIS country, which used to be what the British left was supposed to be all about?

The Iraq war has happened, whether you agreed with it or not. None of its western instigators are going to face prosecution. So get over it already.

The current insurgency is not thanks to the illegality (or otherwise) of the war. It’s due to the instability that removing a dictator who ruled an articifically-constructed country packed with internal religious and ethnic tensions was bound to produce (even if not necessarily to quite these extremes). If anyone with power had listened to Lawrence of Arabia after the first world war we’d never have been in this mess.

Take away the presence of foreign armies, what is happening in Iraq now is what happened in Yugoslavia after the fall of communism. That was another artificial construct of a country held together through the fear of the state, and fear of the state alone. Once the power of the state was destroyed, in both Iraq and Yugoslavia the suppressed intenal tensions rose to the fore.

Whereas other former Soviet or dictator-run states managed a peaceful transition to post-dictatorship existence (notably Czechoslovakia, peacably dividing itself along cultural lines into the Czech Republic and Slovakia), in many others similar tensions to those of Iraq continue, from Ukraine’s (now apparently failed) Orange Revolution to east Germany’s resentment of the west of the country, the Baltic states’ ongoing difficulties in accepting their Russian minorites as their own to Spain’s post-Franco problems with the Basque seperatists, the partition of India after the British Empire withdrew to the continuing problems endemic in the ex-Soviet central Asian states, mostly held together purely through fear and force by post-communist dictatorships.

The thing that has to be accepted is that Iraq is filled with numerous different cultural identities, split on loosely geographical lines. The most obvious are Sunni, Shi’ite and Kurdish. The logical solution is to divide the country between the three, and create three new states – ignore the oil factor, that can be solved through negotiation or creating a loose alliance between the three along the lines of the devolved United Kingdom. The chaos and bloodshed of the partition of India could, under the supervision of an international force, be avoided – as long as all three groups were able to gain from the partition.

But when it comes to the ongoing arguments in the west – especially in Britain and America – even these incredibly vague generalisations seem continually to be ignored, with the whole debate over the situation in Iraq divided purely into “pro-war” and “anti-war” camps, both of which repeatedly misrepresent the other and assume that only their interpretation of events is correct.

Me? I don’t care for either. I didn’t support the war, nor did I oppose it. I simply realised that I didn’t know enough about an incredibly complex situation to form a viable opinon. I still don’t – largely thanks to having got thoroughly bored of the whole thing before the invasion officially started and having changed the channel whenever Iraq news has come on for at least the last two years – which is why I so rarely discuss the bloody thing.

What I do find incredibly irritating is when people from either side start generalising about people’s attitudes towards the Iraq situation. The Euston Manifesto is a prime case in point, in that it misses the point entirely – despite having been written by a bunch of people who are obviously intelligent and whose obsessions with Iraq means they know far more than I.

The point about the divisions on the left is not that there is a pro- and anti-war split. It is that the left as a whole has somehow lost the overarching socialist ideology which once held it together. Although there are still a few Marxians knocking around – including a few of the contributors to this site – the majority of the people who currently make up the left no longer have any real unifying political ideology.

The Euston Manifesto proclaims itself an attempt to provide a framework for this much-needed new left-wing ideology. But while Eustonite Oliver Kamm’s ideas of anti-Totalitarianism may – in the broad sense – be laudible, and while the Bartlet Doctrine may sound fine on TV, for any new codification of what it means to be left-wing in Britain in the early 21st century to be successful, it has to tackle issues in Britain, not in distant countries of which we know nothing.

After all, if anyone really cared as much about Iraq as the Eustonites seem to think, there’s surely no way in hell Labour would have been voted back into power a year ago. So why do they feel the need to bother? All they are doing is focussing on a single symptom of the left’s fragmentation, not the disease as a whole.