Nosemonkey's EUtopia

August 18, 2008
by Nosemonkey
6 Comments

Georgia, Russia, the EU and future UK foreign policy

Yesterday’s Observer was on really rather good form, with a decent long article amply demonstrating the human cost – easy to forget when trying to work out the wider geopolitical remifications:

“They sifted out villagers with Georgian surnames, immediately executing all teenage boys. Nugzari Jashashvili, 65, was returning home across the fields when he saw gunmen approach the house of his neighbour, Gela Chikladze, 50. ‘They cut his throat,’ Jashashvili said.”

I’m focussing on the politics, but that’s not to say that this is just an interesting intellectual exercise in trying to predict the future of Eurasian relations. People have been killed in untold numbers in Georgia and South Ossetia, both by the Georgian and Russian armies and by bands of roving maniacs with guns, loosely fighting in what they see as the interest of one side or the other. There has been ethnic cleansing. People continue to die. The death toll may be unknown, but it is in the thousands.

Further on, a good think piece from Neil Acherson, and a moderately sensible editorial that makes a couple of interesting arguments:

“One crucial difference between the current East-West confrontation and the Cold War is that, this time, the economic ties binding the two sides are stronger. Russia needs access to Western markets; the West – and Europe in particular – needs Russian oil and gas. That creates an opportunity for the European Union, the world’s largest single market, to play a moderating role, steering the conversation away from military grandstanding and towards economic negotiation…

“Such aggression must not be rewarded. But Cold War-style brinkmanship will not make Russia’s neighbours safer. It will only reinforce the Kremlin’s view that small states are pawns in a strategic game. The best guarantee of security and peace in Europe since the end of the Cold War has been economic integration, achieved through the EU. It is Brussels, not Washington, that stands the best chance of persuading Moscow to change its ways.”

Today this is followed up by a piece on Comment is Free by Lib Dem MEP Graham Watson, again making the case for the EU as peacebroker:

“Europe is the only player that can be seen as an honest broker… Europe’s initial ambivalence might prove the unlikely key to its success. Post-Soviet member states are more inclined to lay blame for the conflict at Russia’s door; others, including Italy, have expressed an opposing view. By acknowledging that there are different opinions over responsibility for this conflict, the EU can better adopt a position of neutrality in its negotiations.”

Yes, Watson may be partisan, but I can’t do anything other than agree 100% with him on this:

Playing to the gallery of populist opinion is short-sighted but inevitable at this point in America’s election cycle. But not all EU member states have resisted that temptation either. Notably, Britain’s foreign secretary, David Miliband, and the Conservative leader, David Cameron, have engaged in a race to the bottom with each determined to use tougher, more anti-Russian rhetoric than the other. It is an unedifying spectacle that proves their mutual lack of suitability for the job that they are really squabbling over.

For reasons best known to himself, Miliband has been baiting Moscow for months in a series of vaguely populist soundbytes that have been highly critical of the Kremlin, further escalating the ongoing UK/Russia tensions that have been on the up since before the Litvinenko affair. Cameron… Well, what to make of Cameron? Thus far he’s rarely bothered making much of an effort when it comes to foreign affairs, far happier to score easy points at home. But his Tbilisi trip – coming as it has after the overly-extended decision to pull the Tory MEPs out of the EPP group (against their will) and his half-hearted attempt to build an alliance with the Czech Republic to push EU reform down an ill-defined new path – has nudged me right to the brink of declaring Cameron a man with no sense of the realities of international relations and foreign diplomacy.

Hell, with people like Cameron and Miliband potentially in charge of the UK’s foreign policy, I say bring on an EU-based common foreign policy as soon as possible. When it comes to The Great Game, we can’t risk having second-rate minds with no concept of history at the helm. Why are we still allowing Cameron and Miliband to go around kicking the hornet’s nest when a collective effort is so vital? Because just as it is not in the EU’s interest to alienate Russia thanks to Moscow’s control of so many vital energy supplies, it is not in Britain‘s either. Come on – this is Britain we’re talking about. We used to be good at this stuff. We didn’t get such a vast Empire by making stupid statements and shaking our fists at people – we got it through a combination of overwhelming military force and backed up with insanely good intelligence and expert diplomacy. We no longer have the overwhelming military force – which makes diplomacy and intelligence all the more vital. Miliband and Cameron, in their Georgia statements, appear to possess neither.

And now for a question, the answer to which I genuinely can’t work out. Considering that the Council of Europe exists to promote democracy, justice and the rule of law, contains all EU member states, plus every other European state with an interest in this affair – Turkey, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Armenia – and, most importantly, both Russia and Georgia, why isn’t it the CoE rather than the EU that is taking the lead here?

August 16, 2008
by Nosemonkey
1 Comment

Oil and gas pipelines in the Caucasus

Over the last few days, my post linking the Georgia / Russia dispute over South Ossetia into the politics of energy supply has received a sizable amount of traffic, largely thanks to the funky pipeline maps I dug out. As such, I thought I’d try and get some more detail and – thanks to the University of Texas’ superb online map resource, now I’ve found an ideal one. It dates from 2001, so is slightly out of date, but still – it gives a rather good idea of what’s at stake in the entire Caspian / Black Sea region – as well as showing just why Georgia’s so important. Click on the image below to have a look at the full-sized version (Warning – it’s 2.5 megs, so not good for dial-up…)

August 15, 2008
by Nosemonkey
2 Comments

Strong words from the US, but it’s up to the EU – for now

From the press conference held by Condoleezza Rice this afternoon on the South Ossetia situation:

“the way that Russia has brutally pushed this military operation well beyond the bounds of anything that might have related to South Ossetia calls into question Russia’s suitability for all kinds of activities that it has said that it wants to be a part of…

I’m going to France because we support very strongly the European presidency, which is France, in its mediation efforts. I think it’s best that those mediation efforts now be in the hands of the French. We’ll continue to support those…

I am not going to sit here and judge each Russian military operation. I am going to say that when you start bombing ports and threatening to bomb airfields and bombing a city like Gori and bringing troops in a flanking maneuver on the western flank of Georgia and tying up the main roads between Georgia – between Tbilisi and Gori, that’s well beyond anything that is needed to protect Russian peacekeepers. And that is why Russia is starting to face international condemnation for what it is doing.

This is not 1968 and the invasion of Czechoslovakia, where Russia can threaten its neighbors, occupy a capital, overthrow a government, and get away with it. Things have changed…

if you now look across Central and Eastern Europe, one thing that is also very different from just a few decades ago is that the countries that were liberated after the breakup of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, countries like the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, the Baltic states and the aspirants – Albania, Croatia, Macedonia and others are now – have made the transition and are making the transition into transatlantic institutions. That allows them both to resolve their differences and to have a reason, a spur, for internal reform and further democratization, the appropriate relationship between civilian and military leaders and so forth and so on. That is why Membership Action Plan has been so valuable, and it’s why the United States continues to stand for Membership Action Plan for Georgia and Ukraine….

Now, I’m not going to try to speculate on Russian motives, but let me just say the following. To the degree that there was intended to be some message beyond the frozen conflicts of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the message is not that Russia can use its military power in a brutal way against a small neighboring state. The message is that Russia has perhaps not accepted that it is time to move on from the Cold War and it is time to move to a new era in which relations between states are on the basis of equality and sovereignty and economic integration.

Now, Russia has said that that is the future that it wishes, that that is the future it wishes with the EU, that is the future it wishes with the United States and with any number of international organizations. So the message, unfortunately, that is being sent is that it is important to think again about whether, in fact, Russia will be committed to the kind of behavior that would make its involvement in those institutions appropriate.”

Now, what to make of that? The US administration has made its position very clear – complete and utter disapproval, couched in strong terms evoking Russia’s past unilateral belligerence during the Cold War (though not mentioning the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan, you’ll note – *ahem*).

But these are the words of an outgoing presidency, with only a few months left to go. Does the disapproval of Bush and co really matter to Moscow? And will Sarkozy – as EU president – take up the mantle and continue the tough talk? Can the EU risk being as bombastic in its rhetoric when cordial relations with Russia are so important for Europe’s ongoing prosperity – and when the EU itself is split between those who take the American line and those, like Germany and Italy, more inclined to the softly-softly approach?

The diplomatic fall-out of this one promises to be very interesting indeed. How the West responds could be vital – but tough words may not be enough. The US is in one of its constitutionally-prescribed periods of impotence; with a member of the Security Council one of the parties involved, the UN is not an option; NATO has no jurisdiction, and is seen by some as one of the catalysts; Europe is currently divided. And yet it is to the EU that the world seems to be looking for leadership and mediation – albeit without much expectation of success.

This really is interesting. For advocates of a single EU foreign policy, and of greater EU involvement on the world stage, this is an ideal opportunity to prove that Brussels has got what it takes. I’m pessimistic of the chances so far, but if the US is content to take a back seat on this one (which means less of the public Cold War rhetoric cranking up the tensions, more behind the scenes support) – and considering Sarkozy’s apparently passable relationship with Putin and the Kremlin – they may just be able to pull something off.

August 15, 2008
by Nosemonkey
12 Comments

Russia, Georgia, the former USSR and fear

Yes, OK. We get it. You guys have a big, powerful army and you aren’t afraid to use it.

Nicholas II, Lenin, Stalin, Putin and Medvedev That’s meant to discourage eastern European countries – all of whom have less then pleasant memories of armies from Russia invading, looting, raping, pillaging and occupying them for the last several centuries – from looking to NATO for help and signing up to the proposed US missile defence shield how, exactly?

Sure enough, Poland’s now signed up to the American scheme.

But the thing is, by now surely it must be obvious to Moscow that the West is not a military threat? We can’t take down a bunch of beardy religious fanatics with AK-47s – what hope do we have against a million-man army that seems to like to test out its equipment at random every few years to stop it getting rusty? All the West’s managed to do in the last few days (and this goes for the US and NATO as much as the EU) is express mild disapproval while disagreeing on precisely what form the ineffective slap on the wrist should take.

So I’m beginning to think that Russia simply doesn’t care any more. The Georgian escapade was a classic bit of imperialist aggression dressed up as humanitarian intervention, and they’ve completely got away with it. Yes, it looks as though they may well have begun to withdraw from Georgian territory now, but the message to Russia’s neighbours (well, bar China, perhaps) is clear: if we want to, we can fuck you up – there’s nothing you can do about it, and your new buddies in the West aren’t going to be any help either.

Russia’s effectively declared herself rogue – not necessarily hostile rogue, but unpredictable rogue. Riggs to the West’s Murtaugh. She’s not prepared to follow the rules, barely bothers paying lip-service to them, and has an agenda all her own. The thing is, just like poor old Danny Glover as Murtaugh, we’ve really got no choice but to be partners with her, and hope that she mellows with time. Because something we’ve all known for years is becoming increasingly obvious – there’s not a lot we can do to change Russia’s course.

—

A related aside – worth developing further sometime – is the idea that Russia (much like the EU, in fact) is still trying to work out what it is for in a post-Cold War world. The old federation that was the Soviet Union has already splintered. The Russian Federation is similarly vast, similarly packed with diverse peoples and cultures – with 27 officially-recognised languages within its borders. But why?

What purpose does “Russia” serve? Why shouldn’t the Chechens follow the Khazaks, Estonians and Ukrainians to independence? Why shouldn’t the Chuckchis, Yakuts, Buryats, Adyghes, Kalmyks, Chuvash, Karachays, Balkars, Ingush, Khakas, Komi, Udmurts, Nenets, Khants, Tatars, Mari, Mansi or any of the other federalised subgroups?

Just as I’ve long been asking what the EU’s for now that the original idea seems obsolete, Russia has been asking itself the same question. Without the binding ideology of communism for the elites (and fear for those beneath), what has been holding what remains of the Soviet Union together? As the Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia begin to thrive as part of the EU, as former Soviet territories like Georgia and Ukraine look to NATO membership and cozy up to the West – not to mention the old Russian Imperial territory of Finland (sitting pretty with the 12th highest GDP per capita in the world), what’s to prevent other parts of the Russian empire deciding that they’ve had enough?

Well, where the EU’s going for aspiration, after the brutally over-the-top actions of the Russian military in Georgia over the last week (and even more so in the Chechen wars – the second of which has technically been running for nearly a decade now), it’s hard not to see a return to federalism by fear. It’s a fine Russian tradition. Indeed, fear and repression are pretty much the only reason the old Russian Empire managed to hold itself together for so many years. Democracy in Russia has not been enough – opposition parties are still so under-supported as to be laughable. Authoritarian-seeming Putin, unafraid to act and act fast – remains Russia’s most popular leader since, erm… Stalin.

And so, it seems, we may be entering a new phase of Russian Imperialism:

“”It is clear that we need the kind of idea for which one will not be sorry to give one’s life. And the building of civil society, of the rule of law, of a prosperous society we find uninteresting. Indeed, we would rather squander everything and end our lives with suicide, than scrupulously count the credit and the debit, invest, corporatize, organize on cooperative lines, and so on. We find that tedious. We would rather try to absorb the enormous spaces of Siberia and the Far East, so that the islands of the Pacific Ocean become indigenously ours, we will fight for centuries with Europe for the Baltic States, and with Turkey for the Dardanelles – that is our way.”

(Original here, for those who can read Estonian…)

August 13, 2008
by Nosemonkey
10 Comments

The EU’s Caucasion lessons

So, despite the apparent truce following Moscow’s insanely over-the-top response to Georgia’s silly South Ossetian venture, it sounds like Russia’s still “peacekeeping” in Georgian territory. This is otherwise known as “invading a sovereign nation just for the hell of it”.

Here’s a handy solution to all our problems: Georgia – stop playing the victim, you brought it on yourself; Russia – stop acting like a dick.

Meanwhile, the possibility of a common EU foreign policy becomes more remote by the hour. Which idiot was it who thought that an EU Foreign Minister and diplomatic service was a good idea again? If we can’t agree among ourselves, how the hell are we going to convince other world powers?

Eastern Europe used to be the Soviet Union’s buffer zone against the West; it’s now become the West’s buffer-zone against Russia. Unsurprisingly, those countries that make up said buffer-zone aren’t best pleased – especially when they see so little constructive action from the West when a country they consider one of their own is being bullied by the Russians. Because now the ex-Warsaw Pact EU member states are firmly supporting Georgia while many Western European states, keen not to piss off Moscow, are treading more carefully. The fault-lines within the EU – that have been there ever since 2004’s expansion thanks to the continued failure to come up with new post-enlargement rules and regulations – are becoming painfully apparent.

I’ve long been saying that EU relations with Russia are one of the Union’s most pressing concerns. They seem to be becoming more so. If the EU can’t agree a solution to this – or at least a unified approach – then the potential for disaster is immense. Russia will be pissed off. Georgia will be pissed off. The former Warsaw Pact EU member states will be pissed off. Europe’s only non-Russian energy supply route will be jeopardised. And the EU’s impotence on the world stage will be painfully apparent to all.

And, while the EU dithers on the sidelines, the people of Georgia and South Ossetia are still hiding from tanks, ducking from jets, and picking through the rubble to recover their shattered belongings and their dead. A situation that requires quick action has been allowed to continue unchecked in part thanks to the wasted time of trying to find a common European solution. Nice one, guys.

This is why the EU needs to decide – collectively and decisively – what it is for. Episodes like this one – following so closely on the heels of the disunited front put up over Kosovo’s independence – show that one thing the EU is definitely not for is collective foreign diplomacy. So let’s give up on the idea already. It’s getting embarrassing.

Update: Yup. This pretty much sums it up:

“at every level, Europe appears to be in the thick of events, doing its best to stop the bloodshed. But, on closer inspection, this is the traditional sort of European activity: grand proposals, the clocking of plenty of frequent flyer air miles, yet little of substance.”

August 11, 2008
by Nosemonkey
3 Comments

South Ossetia: Still simmering

Convoy of Russian tanks in South Ossetia So it seems that Georgia just doesn’t know when she’s beat – although quite what the real situation is there nobody seems to know, as there’s so much disinformation around. Who’s at fault here – Russia or Georgia? The answer’s simple – it’s both.

What’s likely to be most instructive now is not how Russia acts, nor Georgia, but how the West (and especially the European Union, supposedly so keen to act more decisively in the international arena on issues just such as this) responds to those actions. So far, it’s hard not to agree with anti-EU blog EU Referendum on the EU’s slowness.

Because the EU, lest we forget, has its own former Soviet states as members these days. For EU citizens in the likes of Latvia, Lithuania and – espcially – Estonia (as well as throughout the rest of the former Warsaw Pact countries that are now within the European fold), the situation in Georgia is likely to seem all too familiar. Yes, Georgia struck first – but so did the Hungarian revolutionaries in ’56, the Czechs in ’68…

No, the comparison’s not perfect – it’s deeply flawed and obscured by ideology and the memories of the last couple of generations’ attempts to shake off rule from Moscow (plus it’s still not entirely clear just what it was that provoked Georgia into acting – was it actually Russian agents, or simply pissed-off Ossetians, fed up with still being a part of a country they’ve been trying to leave for a decade and a half?). But such concerns are going to be there nonetheless – and the longer the West goes without some kind of decisive action to bring the conflict to an end, the more those concerns are going to grow.

If Russia truly is invading Georgia proper (as some reports have begun to suggest), then the EU and the rest of the West are faced with their toughest call in an age. As far as I can tell, NATO has no jurisdiction in Georgia while she’s not a member – and a physical stand-off between NATO peace-keeping troops and Russian forces would only further underscore the “New Cold War” rhetoric that’s being spouted on both sides of the divide (remember Russia’s displeasure over the proposed US missile shield?), making for a potentially disastrous PR move. The UN is also obviously a no-go, what with Russia being on the Security Council. Which means, in terms of a Western military response to prevent further escalation, that the only option is another Kosovo/Iraq-style operation that will, in terms of international law, be illegal. And so further piss Russia off.

At the moment, it’s hard not to see the West being played expertly by both sides: Russia’s so far managing to act with impunity within its traditional sphere of influence (just like the good old days), while Georgia’s getting to play the martyr and ratchet up Western guilt, knowing that any country that Russia’s attacking is pretty much guaranteed to have the West on its side. (Der Spiegel goes further, arguing that the current situation also serves the purposes of the EU and US. The US? Maybe, as a belligerent Russia may increase eastern European support for its missile shield. But the EU? I don’t see how this can end well for the EU… Too much potential for pissing off Russia on one side and showing the ex-communist EU member states and wannabe member states that, when it comes to the crunch, Brussels simply hasn’t got the balls to stand up to Moscow.)

And so the only relatively safe route I can see at the moment – if we’re to avoid the Georgia situation bubbling over and causing problems in other regions along the Russian fringe – is to get China to mediate. China’s got very little interest in the Caucasus, is just as coldly cordial to Russia as to the West, and is desperate to put on a good show while the Olympics are on. She’s also pretty much the only country big and powerful enough for both Russia and the West to bother listening to.

So, come on, China…

August 10, 2008
by Nosemonkey
19 Comments

Georgia: Why?

So, now that Georgia seems to have withdrawn from South Ossetia in the face of the overwhelming force of Russia’s displeasure, the question has to be asked: how on earth did they think they were going to be able to get away with it?

As has been frequently mentioned over the last few days, Georgia has been trying to join NATO of late – and had it done so already, NATO may well have had to come to her aid when Russia started launching airstrikes. But why would NATO want such a small, impoverished country with a track record of more or less continuous political corruption since independence, even since the Rose Revolution supposedly ushered in a new age of democratic accountability back in 2003?

Georgia pipelines The map to the left may indicate why. And yes this is all part of my slowly developing geopolitics of European energy supply theory of relations between Russia and the west (see also theories about Armenia and Serbia – and a denial from Gazprom executive Alexander Medvedev (no relation)). Because, you see, the proposed Nabucco pipeline – designed pretty much exclusively to bypass Russian control over European natural gas supplies by providing an alternate, non-Russian route from the gas fields of Central Asia – is, in part, intended to be supplied by pipelines that run right through Georgia.

The recent military action has already caused alarm about existing oil and gas supplies (with a nice overview of the current situation from Reuters). But check the map to the left – the proposed route of the Nabucco pipeline, designed pretty much exclusively to prevent Russia from being able to play politics with European energy supply, as has already happened in Ukraine and elsewhere – including, ahem… Georgia (and again).

Nabucco - the missing link For more on Nabucco’s significance, check out this handy report (warning, PDF), which contains the handy graphic to the left, demonstrating how Nabucco is intended to be “the missing link” between the giant gas sources of Central Asia and the dwindling gas supplies/rising demand of Europe (all numbers in billions of cubic metres).

Gas supply routes into Europe And so it should all begin to come clear. The West wants Georgia for its strategic value as one of the links in the Caucasian energy chain – the only route from Central Asia to Europe that doesn’t involve passing through less than reliable countries like Russia or Iran. The only supply route for non-European natural gas that will not be under Russian control (as can be seen in the map to the left) – and a direct competitor to Russia’s own planned Blue Stream pipeline.

Georgia, meanwhile, knowing her own strategic importance, seems merely to have overplayed her hand and acted too soon – perhaps assuming that her new Western partners (most of whom have funded the country’s existing pipelines via the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development) would be quicker to protect their investment, perhaps assuming that Russia under Medvedev would be slower to act about such things than Russia under Putin. This despite Medvedev being the former chairman of Russian state energy giant Gazprom, the owner of a third of the world’s gas supplies, and the man responsible for the 2006 price hike on Georgian energy supplies.

It’s hard, then, not to think that Georgia’s been rather stupid about this whole affair. Most NATO member states, so keen on the concept of self-determination, are hardly going to look too favourably on forcing a breakaway region to step in line – especially after so many of them have so recently backed Kosovo’s independence. Plus, of course, South Ossetia is largely just rocks and mountains with very little in the way of value. Why not just let them go their own way? They’ve been causing trouble ever since the fall of the USSR – if they want independence so much, then it’s good riddance to bad rubbish, surely?

So, has anyone managed to come up with a reasonable explanation for Georgia getting involved in such a stupid fight? Fistful has had a couple of stabs, but I still can’t see how the Georgian government was this dumb…

Update: See also the map below, which provides a broader regional context along with greater detail – click for (very) big:

August 9, 2008
by Nosemonkey
3 Comments

South Ossetia: The bear strikes back

An apartment on fire in the Georgian town of Gori, supposedly hit by a Russian air strike

The South Ossetia crisis really is kicking off – is this going to become another Chechnya? Russia’s now apparently launching airstrikes on targets inside Georgia itself (the photo to the left being of Gori, the town where Stalin was born, fact fans) and is sending more troops. Although Russian President Medvedev is still referring to this as a “peace enforcement operation”, it’s now one with a death toll of 1,500 so far (plus 30,000 refugees fleeing the region – from a South Ossetian population of only 75,000 or so…).

Georgian President Saakashvili, meanwhile, is under no illusions that his country’s at war – and nor, it would seem, is former Russian President (and current Prime Minister, lest we forget) Putin: “War has started after a well-planned invasion”

Georgia by now must be starting to realise that it’s really very silly to get into a fight with the weak little kid in the class when he’s got a very large, very angry bear of a cousin standing next to him.

And so the panic that was in South Ossetia yesterday is moving into Georgia proper today, as hasty plans are made to evacuate, while a flick through the archives at Georgia on my Mind (written by a Norwegian, decidedly sympathetic to Georgia, who left the country yesterday) will give a speedy indication of just how long this conflict’s been brewing for.

Elsewhere, more handy blogs for updates and insight: The Caucasian Knot (superb stuff, combining press reviews with separate analysis and rumours from the ground), while Global Voices Online has a translated roundup of cyrillic blog reactions, including one from someone hiding in a basement in the South Ossetian capital as the mortars rain down, and a handy look at who’s to blame for the crisis (written by the author of The Caucasian Knot).

The Economist’s Edward Lucas also has some handy analysis (following his earlier warning piece about the dangers of tensions escalating, published the very day before they did), while Paul Noble of WindowOnEurasia (and the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy) warns of a background of growing radicalisation among Caucasian minorities in recent years that could see the current conflict spread wider than just Georgia/South Ossetia.

Sadly, this may well just be the start.

16:15 (UK time) update: Oh… From Reuters: Abkhaz separatists strike disputed Georgia gorge

Abkhazia said on Saturday it has launched an operation to drive Georgia out of a disputed gorge, possibly opening a “second front” in Tbilisi’s battle to retain fractious breakaway regions.

The separatist foreign minister Sergei Shamba said Abkhazian artillery and warplanes struck Georgian forces in Kodori, a narrow gorge which cuts deep into the Abkhazian territory and is an ideal route for any invasion in the region.

There are also reports – TV only so far – that Putin has flown back from the Olympics in Beijing (where he apparently told President Bush that there would only be a ceasefire when there are no Georgian troops left in South Ossetia), and is currently in North Ossetia, over the Russian border, for purposes unknown. (Though considering his status as a living embodiment of Russian nationalism, it’s hard not to see it as a morale-booster for both the Russian troops and South Ossetians…) A combined EU, US and NATO delegation is also apparently being mobilised to try and negotiate a ceasefire.

August 8, 2008
by Nosemonkey
3 Comments

South Ossetia’s kicking off: An overview

Map of South Ossetia, shamelessly stolen from the Independent I was going to write about this yesterday, because in these days of vastly diminished foreign news staff on national newspapers, the fact that a story about the breakaway Georgian wannabe state made the notoriously understaffed Independent yesterday should indicate that this ongoing standoff was beginning to get more heated. Overnight, sure enough, Georgian forces have moved into place and surrounded the South Ossetian capital, Tskhinvali, with a number of people killed in shelling and airstrikes that started up only a few hours after Russia had negotiated a ceasefire.

For background you could do far worse than Fistful’s handy introduction to South Ossetia from back in March, alongside (as ever) Wikipedia on the Georgian-Ossetian conflict, before noting this New York Times article from April, putting Russia’s renewed interest in the Georgian situation firmly in the context of the aftermath of Kosovo’s independence.

You may also want to have a gander at this map of the ethnic makeup of the Caucasus region, which may also indicate why Russia’s so interested. Yep – the Ossetians are slap-bang on the same frontier as Chechnya, Dagestan and Ingushetia, all of which have spent most of the years since the collapse of the Soviet Union more or less in conflict with both the Kremlin and each other, either directly or thanks to fallout from the decidedly unpleasant Chechen wars.

This could, as with all conflicts in the Caucasus, get nasty. Wikipedia seems to have good coverage, EurasiaNet is good on the recent tensions, while this blog seems to be being written by a British energy policy consultant in Georgian capital Tblisi, noting that army reservists are being called up and provides some analysis, while also pointing to this handy UN-funded English-language Georgian news site, which is providing more regular and detailed coverage than anywhere else I’ve found so far.

August 6, 2008
by Nosemonkey
6 Comments

Save the Imperial Martyr!

Pint of beer So then, nutty eurosceptic types who blamed the so-called Metric Martyrs‘ persecution on the EU (rather than, erm… a combination of a pre-EEC British decision to simplify measurements and their own obstinacy in not maintaining legal scales) – what’s the response to this one?

A restaurant owner has described laws which ban him from serving beer by the litre as “barmy” after he was threatened with court action…

Mr Davison, who owns the Kuchnia Polska restaurant in Doncaster, was told to change his glasses within 28 days or face a court hearing and a £2,000 fine.

The 1988 Weights and Measures Act says draught beer must be sold in pints.”

Curse that meddling EU, forcing us to serve beer in pints! Curse it! Even though it had nothing to do with the 1988 Weights and Measures Act! And even though it’s quite happy – unlike the British government – to have two systems of measurement continue to work in tandem!
Continue Reading →

August 6, 2008
by Nosemonkey
7 Comments

What is the EU for? (Part 2)

This started off as a reply to comments on this post, but got a bit lengthy…

EU Constitution mastermind Valery Giscard D'Estaing

The Convention on the Future of Europe (which drew up the failed EU Constitution) was, in its early stages, a step in the right direction. But – vitally – the public were never fully brought on board despite this being one of the key aims mentioned in the inaugural meeting (and despite the website being quite good, I don’t recall much press coverage or wider debate at the time, nor much effort being made to canvas the views of the peoples of Europe). It ended up being a grand talking-shop for a bunch of lobbyists and politicians (if a slightly wider group of politicians than usual in EU treaty-writing), and coming up with something so vast and complex that it could never be understood by the people it was supposed to sell itself to (though at least it was better on this front than the Lisbon Treaty, I suppose).

It also, as far as I can tell, went far beyond its initial remit – to simplify and clarify the meaning of previous treaties, define the limits of the EU’s power in line with the subsidiarity concept, and push for greater democracy, efficiency and transparency – while not going far enough on any of those main points. It certainly failed dismally in clarifying what the old treaties meant, at any rate – and hell, even the Charter of Fundamental Rights ended up being something countries – i.e. the UK – could opt out of, despite that being another key issue highlighted in the wake of Nice… (Here’s probably not the place to have a moan about what that document includes as fundamental rights, many of which are not so much “rights” as “privileges”…)

What I’d like to see happen (though I have no illusions that it will) now that the Lisbon Treaty also seems to be dying is the birth of a genuine, Europe-wide discussion of the kind Peter mentioned in his first comment – hell, even debates conducted within each state (like that in France in the run-up to their 2005 referendum) would be a start. The Commission’s been making some decent efforts over the last few years, and Margot Wallstrom‘s convinced me that she truly would like a genuine debate while making some good first steps in the right direction – but so far none of these have really taken off, or gone anywhere near far enough.

But this is vital – fundamental. Get the people thinking about the EU, rather than just ignoring it. Get them talking about it. Get them to say what they think it is and what it should be for. Because I’m pretty certain that currently no one knows – and if our representatives at these meetings are starting from a position of ignorance about what the people they are representing actually want, little wonder that they end up with something that the people then reject.

Bruno‘s definitely right about the split between the political establishment and the people. Only the real problem, I’d say, is not at EU level – I’d again agree with Peter (in his second comment), and say it’s the national politicians who are the problem. They don’t know what their people want from the EU, because the people themselves don’t know. But rather than try to get their people thinking and talking about it so they can then, y’know, represent their people, they take the “father knows best” line and forge ahead regardless – in the process constructing an EU without any real guiding principles or final goals, and that the people who have to live with it have had no say in creating.

You wouldn’t start constructing a building with no plans, no idea of the number of floors, rooms, windows and doors, and no idea what the people who are going to be using it are going to be using it for. Yet that’s precisely what’s been happening with the EU for decades. It’s no longer (if it ever was) just a trading block. It’s no longer (if it ever was) heading towards a federal superstate. It’s something altogether new and altogether misunderstood – because the EU itself doesn’t know what it is or what it’s for.

Until the EU works out what it’s for – a purpose that really must be set by the peoples of Europe if it’s going to have any chance at long-term survival – the same unproductive nonsense is going to continue ad infinitum.

(For more along these lines, check out What is the EU for? (Part 1) and the dLiberation blog I did for openDemocracy last year, focussing pretty much exclusively on the problems of getting the people to participate meaningfully in EU reform…)

August 5, 2008
by Nosemonkey
2 Comments

The WHO on the CAP

Bad news for Brussels, as the World Health Organisation slams the Common Agricultural Policy:

The cardiovascular disease burden attributable to CAP appears substantial. Furthermore, these calculations were conservative estimates, and the true mortality burden may be higher.

More here:

Direct subsidies to farmers have led to massive overproduction of milk and beef in Europe, with the excess food then disposed of “principally as fats hidden in processed foods,”…

Looking at the 15 EU states before the 2004 round of enlargement, the annual “mortality contribution attributable to CAP was approximately 9,800 additional CHD deaths and 3,000 additional stroke deaths within the EU,” the study says, with France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK seeing the highest numbers of excess deaths.

The eurosceptics are going to have a field day with this one – and who can blame them? Is there anyone bar the French and the occasional farmer who thinks the CAP is a good thing?

August 5, 2008
by Nosemonkey
Comments Off on The Czech Republic and the Lisbon Treaty

The Czech Republic and the Lisbon Treaty

Handy overview today from the EU Observer – worth a look for UK-centered readers as well, as these guys are the closest that Tory leader David Cameron’s got to allies on the continent, so may just provide a hint as to his as yet decidedly unclear attitude towards the EU:

A large segment of the Czech political elite makes no secret of its discontentment with EU membership. These politicians fiercely oppose further European integration, and consider the whole European project a major threat to Czech sovereignty.

President Klaus – by far the most outspoken eurosceptic in Central-Europe – made no secret of his pleasure at the Irish No. While the office of the Czech president is largely honorary, his signature is needed to round up the ratification process of the Lisbon Treaty…

More significant however is the fact the president still has considerable influence on a large segment of the Civic Democratic Party. After the Irish referendum the harsh language of Mr Klaus was echoed by several party members. CDP holds a majority in the Czech Senate where voting on the Lisbon Treaty still needs to take place.

The vote in the Czech Senate is scheduled at the end of the year, after the Constitutional Court has ruled on the compatibility of the Lisbon Treaty with the Czech constitution. Even if its verdict is positive, it is hard to predict the outcome of the vote in the Upper House.

I’m not convinced by the latter half of the article with its dire warnings of potential disaster if the Czechs vote Lisbon down, but still – worth a gander. (And if anyone knows of any English-language Czech politics blogs/news sites that are still being updated, I’d be grateful for a heads-up, as I’ve got rather out of touch over the last few years and a lot of my old bookmarks are now dead.)

August 5, 2008
by Nosemonkey
6 Comments

“We cannot do business like this in future”

Thus spake Tony Blair, echoing Gerhard Schröder, following the negotiations for the shoddy Treaty of Nice back in 2000. And yet the last eight years have seen the European Union do business in exactly the same way, time and time again – last-minute concessions, bad compromises, unimaginative and ineffective solutions to problems that sometimes didn’t exist in the first place.

The Constitution, designed to rectify the mistakes of Nice’s last-minute compromises ended up inadequate as a result. In turn, the Treaty of Lisbon ended up little more than a shoddy remix with a few contentious bits removed (though not enough for its critics).

With Lisbon on the verge of death, is there any sign of the kind of radical rethinks and approaches that may shake the EU out of its growing torpor? Well, not really. But…

Unless Ireland can be persuaded to vote again, Lisbon – which must be ratified by all 27 nations to come into force – will die and the EU will be left operating under rules agreed to at 3:25 a.m. in Nice on Dec. 11, 2000.

Increasingly, however, diplomats are wondering whether that would be such a bad thing…

True, Lisbon is designed to streamline procedures that were creaking even in 2000, when the EU had only 15 member states, and that get more unwieldy with each nation that joins. But, in some ways, Lisbon would be a step backward.

There’s a compelling case made in this IHT article. Do go and read the whole thing. Not only is it an intriguing suggestion for a way forward, pulling together a few ideas I’ve seen elsewhere and adding to them to create a coherent strategy, but it’s also a handy overview of some of the key issues Lisbon was attempting (poorly) to address.