Paul Krugman: “If there were any villains, they were the architects of the euro”
June 5, 2012
by Nosemonkey
Comments Off on Krugman on Soros on the eurocrisis
June 5, 2012
by Nosemonkey
Comments Off on Krugman on Soros on the eurocrisis
Paul Krugman: “If there were any villains, they were the architects of the euro”
June 4, 2012
by Nosemonkey
Comments Off on Worth a read: Soros on the euro and EU
Three months until the euro’s past saving, eh? I’ve heard that one before… Still, very much well worth reading George Soros’ recent eurocrisis speech in full – an interesting take with much to be said for it. After recent posts here, where I’ve called for an EU Reformation, one passage in particular leapt out (emphasis mine):
“While the European Union was being created, the leadership was in the forefront of further integration; but after the outbreak of the financial crisis the authorities became wedded to preserving the status quo. This has forced all those who consider the status quo unsustainable or intolerable into an anti-European posture. That is the political dynamic that makes the disintegration of the European Union just as self-reinforcing as its creation has been.”
He’s right, you know. I’ve been complaining about the stagnation of the EU ever since I first started blogging about the damned thing back in 2003. And as I said in my last post, “>we desperately need action. I can feel myself getting this -><- close to giving up altogether. And when you start to lose your friends, how the hell can you expect anyone else to stick with you?
June 3, 2012
by Nosemonkey
3 Comments
A telling paragraph in Der Spiegel which fits in neatly with my onging “blame the European Council” approach when it comes to pretty much everything that’s wrong with the way the EU works. (Emphasis mine):
“European Central Bank head Mario Draghi provided what was perhaps the most urgent appeal to euro-zone political leaders on Thursday in comments delivered to the European Parliament in Brussels. He said the structure of the euro as it stands now is ‘unsustainable unless further steps are taken’ and also criticized European heads of state and government for not being clear about their common currency strategy. Leaders, he said, ‘must clarify what is the vision … what is the euro going to look like a certain number of years from now?’ Draghi also said that the ECB was unable to save the euro on its own and could not ‘fill the vacuum of the lack of action by national governments.’“
And then on to Project Syndicate, where former IMF man Daniel Gros, now Director of the Centre for European Policy Studies, adds to the case in a piece perhaps tellingly entitled Democracy versus the eurozone:
“all of those grandiose plans to create a political union to support the euro with a common fiscal policy cannot work as long as EU member countries remain both democratic and sovereign. Governments may sign treaties and make solemn commitments to subordinate their fiscal policy to EU rules (or to be more precise, to the wishes of Germany and the European Central Bank). But, in the end, the ‘people’ remain the real sovereign, and they can choose to ignore their governments’ promises and reject any adjustment program from ‘Brussels.’
“…As long as member states remain fully sovereign, no one can fully reassure investors that in the event of a eurozone breakup, some states will not simply refuse to pay, or at least refuse to pay for the others. It is not surprising that bonds issued by the European Financial Stability Facility (the eurozone’s rescue fund) are trading at a substantial premium over German debt.”
And then to Business Insider for a bit of potential contradiction to the above, with a solid case that Independent Central Banking has been a failure and (my interpretation/paraphrase) we should stop pretending that Economics is a science where the “best” option can be determined by dispassionate, objective, technocrats (aside: this quantitative analysis of economists’ views of what the eurozone should do next is a perfect illustration of how little economic consensus there is – your take on the best move will be as much ideological as based on “facts”):
“the choice between inflation and unemployment is a political, not a technical choice. What’s ‘better’? To screw debtors or creditors? To make millions unemployed or to ‘debase the currency’? Those are very important questions. More important, they’re questions that cannot be solved by economics. They can be informed by them, but at the end of the day what you prefer is going to come down to your own moral value system. In other words, it’s a political choice. And the way we make political choices in modern countries is through the democratic process, not through unelected, unaccountable technocrats…
“It’s a political choice, which means that the authorities that make that choice for the whole society need to be appointed, and held accountable, by a political, democratic process.”
But, of course, the powers that be at the head of the EU and eurozone – the members of the European Council – are *not* elected. Not to that position, at least. The European Council is made up of the governments of the European Union’s member states – it is only to *national* positions that they have been elected, not to EU-wide responsibilities. And they are answerable to electorates only at a national, member-state level, not an EU-wide one. They have nothing to fear from anyone except their own, national electorates – and so no need to worry or care about what any European voter thinks about them outside their national boundaries.
This is why consensus and agreement is so hard to reach at European Council level. The focus on member state-level concerns leads to parochial posturing, with one eye firmly focused on the opinion polls back home, not the will of the people continent-wide.
Think of the various heads of state at the European Council as being representatives of their countries’ electorates, then they become little more than grandiose versions of Members of Parliament, sent to represent and act on behalf of their constituents’ best interest.
Yet the way the European Council works is as if Members of Parliament were elected all as independents, rather than members of parties with clear manifesto pledges, and then head to parliament to work in total isolation from each other. It’s representative democracy from the very early days, where loose, easily-broken factions rather than more solidly formalised parties ruled the day.
Now I hate party politics for many reasons, but party political systems do have one key advantage that would become immensely handy at a pan-European level. They tend to oversimplify complex issues into binary choices, and can impose a certain uniformity of opinion on diversely-minded elected representatives by helping to highlight their similarities of opinion over their differences. They can provide focus.
And focus is something we sorely need right now. Enough of the dithering – we need action. At this stage, it almost doesn’t matter what that action is, we’ve been prevaricating for so long that anything is better than nothing.
The reason we have governments at national level – be they one majority party in charge or a coalition – is that decisions need to be taken and implemented for the whole that parts may disagree with, or nothing ever happens. No majority, no coalition consensus? That leads to stagnation. Which may be fine for a while (witness Belgium, happily surviving without a government for a record 541 days without many people even really noticing) – but is a serious danger in times of crisis.
This is why most political systems end up with one person at the top to provide direction – to herd the party/coalition that forms the government towards some kind of decision. Because some decision is better than none at all.
Someone needs to take a decision on what to do sooner or later. The problem we have in the EU is that there is no one to take these vital decisions. Why? Because the governments of the member states don’t want anyone to boss them around.
Think of the European Council as a Cabinet – who is the figurehead? Who’s the Prime Minister or President? Van Rompuy? Don’t make me laugh… He was appointed precisely *because* he would have no power to push the heads of state into a decision, and has zero mandate from the people. Instead, it’s the person who shouts the loudest – which has, until recently, been Angela Merkel. This is no way to conduct business.
And this is where the people come in. If the people of the European Union were to elect a president to head the European Council, that president would be the only person in the room with a pan-European democratic legitimacy. They would be able to provide direction, to push the various national governments into a single agreed course in exactly the way prime ministers and presidents do on a national level. And the heads of state would be obliged to listen to them significantly more than they are obliged to listen to the unelected, anonymous Van Rompuy.
Which is precisely why the EU’s member state governments have so consistently rejected increasing pan-EU democratic involvement. If we had an EU president directly elected by the people of the EU, they would have greater legitimacy to speak at EU level than any of the current members of the European Council. The member state governments would lose their pretence of independence and power – even if that power is illusory and that independence only, as we can see from the current crisis, gives them the ability to *not* act, rather than to take decisions for themselves…
(Update: An alternate take on the same theme from UK MEP Mary Honeyball, arguing for greater emphasis on the European Parliament. This hasn’t been allowed for the self-same reason that an elected EU president hasn’t – increased democratic legitimacy for the European Parliament would seriously undermine the power of the member state governments to set the agenda at EU level.)
(Update 2: Conor responds to this post with a strong, considered argument against an EU presidency. Well worth a read. I tend to agree that a strong European Parliament would be a more effective solution for conferring longer-term democratic legitimacy on the EU. But I also think that the implication of a strong European Parliament would be the start of an *actual* European state – and as such, it’s highly unlikely to be allowed to happen. An elected EU president, meanwhile, could work precisely *because* such a concept would be weak both culturally and institutionally (as Conor convincingly argues) – conning the member states into going for it as they’d think it couldn’t hurt them, and then acting as a stepping stone to more effective EU-level decision-making and a strengthened role for the parliament down the line. President as stepping stone to EU democracy, as it were.)
June 2, 2012
by Nosemonkey
Comments Off on Some ideas for improving Britain’s relations with Europe
The Economist’s Political Editor David Rennie – erstwhile Charlemagne, and before that the Telegraph’s Brussels correspondent – is the single most consistently interesting and insightful commentator on EU affairs in the British Media. And other media, for that matter.
So you can imagine my geeky joy at discovering he’s written a 20,000 word analysis of the Anglo-European relationship just in time for a long Bank Holiday weekend. He provides an introduction/summary here – if you follow this blog you really should go read. Eurogeek heaven.
May 31, 2012
by Nosemonkey
Comments Off on A thoughtful Irish take on the EU Fiscal Treaty on referendum day
Conor Slowey is one of the most interesting EU bloggers out there, and I agree with his take on things more often than not. He’s also Irish, which means he’s had to form a solid yes/no take on the EU’s Fiscal Stability Treaty ahead of today’s Irish referendum on the damned thing.
Rather him than me. It’s a complex, confusing compromise that no one’s really happy with, and it’s near impossible to tell if it’s better than the alternative. Largely because no one knows what the alternative is.
After several months of hard thought, he finally worked out his position just a couple of days ago.
Yep – someone who’s been blogging about the EU regularly for three years, and who knows infinitely more than your average punter about how these things work, has taken several months to work out their position. Little wonder that early reports suggest that turnout could be under 10%. Yes, really – under ten per cent.
Which all makes Conor’s reasoning all the more interesting:
“I really don’t like this treaty. It’s clear that it will neither have prevented the crisis… nor will it do anything to solve it. As I’ve pointed out before, the Treaty is 90% existing EU law, since the European Parliament has passed the “six-pack” of legislation last year. It’s already mostly in force – it has caused political complaints in Belgium, and was part of the reason for the collapse of the Dutch government this year.
“For these reasons I originally wanted a No vote as a political message against austerity and to promote a more balanced approach at the European level. I don’t oppose some level of collective budget discipline nationally if it leads to a positive reform of the Eurozone: Eurobonds, the ECB becoming the lender of last resort, a banking union so that banking problems will not be localised and made the problem of one or two Member States, etc. But it should come as part of a grand bargain where it’s not simply about the core and the periphery, but about building a working Euro-system. Suggestions that ratifying the FST would give Germany enough confidence in the Eurozone to sign up to Eurobonds “sometime in the future” did not comfort me.
“So why have I moved towards a Yes?”
Well worth a read. If it were me voting today, I have to say I have no idea what I’d opt for…
May 30, 2012
by Nosemonkey
2 Comments
The Atlantic: Europe Is Literally Running Out of Money. (Depending on your definition of literally…) – Does the eurozone need quantitative easing?
May 30, 2012
by Nosemonkey
1 Comment
Following on from the last quick post on the near-inevitable failure of a post-euro Drachma, another interesting spot: Eurozone breakup and the doctrine of competing currencies. Also worth reading in full – not sure if I entirely agree, but any advocates of scrapping the euro (because devaluation’s like, great, yeah?) need to be able to answer these arguments, especially about the logic of their position:
“For if their assertion of competing [National Central Banks] were correct, then it could also be deduced that any kind of ‘national competition’ is beneficial, which understandably leads down the perilous path of protectionism, mercantilism and state omnipotence…
“They uphold that national currencies will somehow restrain government spending since profligate politicians will no longer be able to borrow cheaply, something that they could do during the pre-crisis years of the euro. This implies therefore the absurd position that ‘profligacy’ was born with the euro and is deeply embedded in it; whereas all hitherto governments were prudent in their spending when they had their national currencies in place. Such a multi-illegitimate conclusion derives from the observation that interest rates in the eurozone converged and countries like Greece could borrow at rates that only Germany could enjoy before.
“Though the convergence in interest rates is correct, this view is… confusing correlation with causality…
“Moreover one only has to look at the fiscal position of governments prior to the euro era, or to check the current level of government spending and money easing in countries like the US or the UK, to realize that the argument of mystically restrained states by money they create out of thin air, is inconsistent with reality. This assumption effectively casts to the wind all economic knowledge on the subject.
“The bottom line is that under the given circumstances in the eurozone’s political economy, the only realistic/feasible option, even from a Hayekian, free market perspective is the preservation and improvement of the euro.”
May 30, 2012
by Nosemonkey
1 Comment
Interesting piece by an American investment and free trade advocate giving a handy bit of background to Greece’s money woes – just in case you weren’t pessimisitc enough already. Has some convincing, interesting points – worth reading in full:
“Modern Greek monetary history is one of default, inflation and destruction of wealth when the wealth preservation was entrusted to the government. Centuries of history support this statement…
“In the end, Greece has already lost. Europe has lost but can still cut further losses if it acts with congruence. We do not expect that to happen in any pro-active way. It is not in the nature of Europe’s political leaders to reach consensus pro-actively. They do so when forced by market events. We must think of European leaders as reactive, not proactive.”
As I say, well worth reading the whole thing.
May 29, 2012
by Nosemonkey
3 Comments
Slavoj Žižek often seems to exist to be controversial, and I certainly don’t agree with many of the details of his latest piece for the London Review of Books on the Greece crisis (short version, as ever with old Slavoj: the usual consensus is wrong, and the far-left has all the best ideas). However, elements of one passage did stand out as worthy of futher consideration, as it tallies neatly with the way my thinking’s been going of late:
“In his Notes towards the Definition of Culture, T.S. Eliot remarked that there are moments when the only choice is between heresy and non-belief – i.e., when the only way to keep a religion alive is to perform a sectarian split. This is the position in Europe today. Only a new ‘heresy’… can save what is worth saving of the European legacy”
For Žižek, the new heresy of choice is different to what it is for me. And what he considers worth saving of what it is he means to be the “European legacy” may well differ to my take. But for once I think I agree with him on this much – if the EU/Europe is going to get through this crisis, it’s time for some radical new thinking.
The old pro-EU / anti-EU / europhile / eurosceptic divisions have long been irrelevant sidetracks to the key aim of making Europe / the EU as pleasant and prosperous as possible for the people. These days, all those old divisions are obsolete.
I’ve long been labelled as a “pro-EU blogger”. I don’t think this is true any more, if it ever was.
I’m not pro-“EU”. Not pro- this EU. Not with all its flaws. Not with all its slowness to reform. Not with its continual lack of ability to tackle the key priorities facing the people of this continent.
This European Union is simply not good enough. This European Union needs to be replaced pretty much in its entirety.
This European Union has failed.
The cause for this, as I see it, is simple – and long-term readers will find this no surprise:
– It’s not the anti-democratic technocrats that Žižek blames.
– It’s not the eurocrats and red tape so hated by the anti-EU right.
– It’s the EU’s powerlessness in the face of the governments of the member states.
You want more? Have more:
– It’s those governments’ insular, selfish “us first” attitude.
– It’s those governments’ refusal to work to anything longer than national-level electoral cycles.
– It’s those governments’ continual lack of long-term vision.
– It’s those governments’ continual abandonment or watering down of the few long-term plans that emerge for short-term gain.
– It’s those governments’ continual lack of investment in the system – not just in terms of money, but also attention.
– It’s those governments’ continual blocking of any and all efforts to increase democratic participation in pan-European bodies through fear of losing power and legitimacy.
– It’s those governments’ deliberate misrepresentation of what the EU is, does and can do.
– It’s those governments’ constant scaremongering about worst case scenarios if they don’t get their way.
– It’s those governments’ delight in claiming credit for everything good the EU does while blaming it for everything bad, even when it had little or nothing to do with that badness.
– It’s those governments’ constant emphasis on “the national interest”, even though they know that those interests increasingly frequently coincide with their neighbours.
– It’s those governments’ continued refusal to face the fact that they are powerless to survive on their own.
And those are just off the top of my head – feel free to add your own suggestions in the comments.
To return to the Žižek/Eliot quote above, what the EU needs it not reform – it needs a Reformation.
(And yes, this all needs to be developed much further. For starters, I need to work out a new term to describe my position, as none of the old ones fit…)
May 29, 2012
by Nosemonkey
Comments Off on Germany’s economic ideology
Long, catchily-titled briefing paper from the European Council on Foreign Relations looks to be well worth a read in full as we start heading towards next year’s German federal elections amidst ever-increasing frustration with Merkel’s apparent lack of flexibility on austerity. PDF download here – it provides what looks to be a very handy overview of the political/economic positions of the various Germany parties vis a vis the EU and eurozone.
Some highlights from a quick skim, to give a flavour:
“it has often been pointed out that German solutions to the euro crisis are quite different to those demanded by the financial markets and the international press. Germany has been widely criticised for its monetary policy, its inflexibility on austerity measures, its rigid legal approach to treaty change and its selfish view of trade imbalances. Much of what Germany has done to solve the euro crisis has caused concern and drawn criticism from its European partners.
“Germany has also been widely criticised for what it has not done. In particular, both the Christian Democrats and the Free Democrats, the two coalition partners in the German government, rejected two possible solutions to the euro crisis that were proposed by others in Europe: Eurobonds and the idea of turning the ECB into a lender of last resort for the eurozone along the lines of the US Federal Reserve. Both were seen in Germany as undermining the principle of monetary stability and creating moral hazard. Principles such as monetary stability are seen as sacrosanct by both the Christian Democrats and the Free Democrats. But where do they come from? Are they somehow rooted in the German psyche, as some claim, or are they liable to change with electoral majorities?”
And a summary of the conclusions:
“…the political landscape in Germany is more complex and diverse than is sometimes realised elsewhere in Europe. This means that the German negotiating position in Europe could shift significantly should there be a change in government. The extent and nature of the shift will depend on who the coalition partners in the new government will be…
“When negotiating with Germany, its European partners should focus on issues where some movement in the German position can be expected, rather than expect a change on issues on which there is a consensus in Germany. For example, instead of attacking excessive austerity and demanding a renegotiation of the new fiscal treaty, a more promising strategy would be to demand pan-European growth and investment programmes with more spending and taxation power shifted towards the European level. One approach would be to demand the channelling of unused EU funds into investment programmes for the ailing eurozone periphery to provide a short-term stimulus and build a more permanent institutional structure later. Similarly, instead of opposing balanced budgets, asking for more time in reaching them might be met with more understanding from Berlin. And instead of pushing for large ECB interventions, constructive proposals for Eurobonds are more likely to be accepted by the German political elite. From an outside perspective, the final outcome might still look very German. But it might still make life easier for Germany’s European partners.”
May 28, 2012
by Nosemonkey
3 Comments
The New Yorker highlights the primary point that advocates of the “being able to devalue their currency would have saved Greece” / “they should just return to the drachma” / “let’s abolish the eurozone” crowd have yet – that I’ve seen – to adequately answer (emphasis mine):
“a devalued currency would make Greece’s exports cheaper and attract tourists, [but] it would do so at a terrible price, destroying huge amounts of wealth and seriously harming the country’s G.D.P. It would be costly for the rest of Europe, too. Greece owes almost half a trillion euros, and containing the damage would likely require the recapitalization of banks, continent-wide deposit insurance (to prevent bank runs), and more aid to Portugal, Spain, and Italy, which seem to be the next countries in line to default. That’s a very high price to pay for getting rid of Greece, and much more expensive than letting it stay.”
The same article goes on to note a key point that advocates of a more integrated eurozone in turn need to address (again, emphasis mine):
“Rationally… this standoff should end with a compromise — relaxing some austerity measures, and giving Greece a little more aid and time to reform. And we may still end up there. But the catch is that Europe isn’t arguing just about what the most sensible economic policy is. It’s arguing about what is fair.”
Further fiscal integration allowing transfers of money from richer parts of the eurozone to the poorer seems increasingly to be the course being advocated by commentators who want to avoid the likely horrors of a currency collapse. Why? Because it works, and there are any number of examples to show that it works.
But although transfers from rich to poor areas are integral to pretty much any properly-functioning country – from the rich south east of England supporting the poorer north to New York supporting Nevada – there are very few people with money who like to see that money given to poor people they perceive of as “undeserving”. It’s the “I don’t give money to beggars – they’ll only spend it on drugs” attitude, only on a much larger scale. And the meme for the last several years has been precisely this – Greece has been consistently portrayed as having brought this mess on itself.
How to challenge this? The concept of “the undeserving poor” has been around for centuries (see, for example, the various Tudor Poor Laws in England with their references to “idle persons” and “sturdy beggars” who “refuse” to work and contrast with some of the language that’s been used about Greece in the last few years), and isn’t going anywhere any time soon. It’s been hard enough to convince people on a national level that ensuring that the poorest in society aren’t abandoned to their fate is in the interest of society as a whole – and recent drives in the UK and elsewhere to cut back on “benefit scroungers” shows that even there it hasn’t been entirely successful. How on earth do you go about convincing people of the need for a similar system on a continental scale?
(Worth noting as an aside – the increasing anger in Britain about the idea of contributing to another Greek bailout, even indirectly via the IMF, is another wonderful example of how the safety net rhetoric most often used to support the concept of state benefits can be forgotten. After all, which was the first EEC member state to require an IMF bailout? Yep – the UK back in 1976…)
A combination of short memories and a sense that others have brought their troubles on themselves are not conducive to anything like objective assessments of “fairness”. Because “fairness” is almost always a subjective concept, as the New Yorker notes:
“German voters and politicians think it’s unfair to ask Germany to continue to foot the bill for countries that lived beyond their means and piled up huge debts they can’t repay. They think it’s unfair to expect Germany to make an open-ended commitment to support these countries in the absence of meaningful reform. But Greek voters are equally certain that it’s unfair for them to suffer years of slim government budgets and high unemployment in order to repay foreign banks and richer northern neighbors, which have reaped outsized benefits from closer European integration. The grievances aren’t unreasonable, on either side, but the focus on fairness, by making it harder to reach any kind of agreement at all, could prove disastrous.”
Ignore fairness – we need to focus on what works best for everyone. The evolution of the English Poor Laws provides us with a perfect illustration of what works and what doesn’t. Put the “idle vagabonds” in stocks to publicly humiliate them, and then banish them (as was introduced with the Vagabonds and Beggars Act of 1495) is effectively the policy that’s currently being proposed for Greece. It didn’t work then, and it isn’t working now. Increasing the punishment also doesn’t work (in 1530 it was scaled up to whipping, in 1572 came the death penalty for persistent begging). Trying to make it a problem for the local area only (as the Poor Laws of 1597 and 1601 did, levying poor relief at parish level) also didn’t work – then poor areas only get poorer, and the poor from those areas simply leave for richer areas (hence the current UK plans to limit Greek immigration in the event of a collapse).
Indeed, the constant reforms to the various systems until the introduction of universal benefits in the 20th century – where all are treated as equal, all have equal rights to access benefits, and richer areas subsidise the poorer for the benefit of the stability of the economy at large – give us many lessons in what will and won’t work for Greece. The key lesson – and not just from England’s experiences? Demonising and penalising the poor – “deserving” or not – has not only never made the problem go away, but also only ever bred mistrust, resentment, and social unrest. This damages everyone, the rich included. It’s a lesson Merkel and Germany should heed.
May 27, 2012
by Nosemonkey
3 Comments
Much to agree with here – an important piece worth reading in full:
“Is the euro really worth saving? Even the single currency’s diehard backers now acknowledge that it was put together badly and run worse.”
But:
“the people who believe that countries would be better off without the euro gloss over the huge cost of getting there (see article). Even if this break-up were somehow executed flawlessly, banks and firms across the continent would topple because their domestic and foreign assets and liabilities would no longer match. A cascade of defaults and lawsuits would follow. Governments that run deficits would be forced to cut spending brutally or print cash.
“And that is the optimistic scenario.”
The solution?
“it is plainly a move towards federalism…
“we have reluctantly concluded that the nations in the euro zone must share their burdens. The logic is straightforward. The euro zone’s problem is not the debt’s size, but its fragmented structure. Taken as a whole, the stock of euro-zone public debt is 87% of GDP, compared with over 100% in America. Similarly, the banks are not too big for the continent as a whole, just for individual governments. To survive, Europe has to become more federal: the debate is how much more.”
May 27, 2012
by Nosemonkey
Comments Off on A right-wing American history of the euro
A right-wing American take on the history of the EU and euro with which I don’t entirely agree. Except on this point – it’s mostly France’s fault, and mostly due to French national interest. (Which was why the Americans wanted Britain to join and be active in the first place, of course – to keep France in check…)
The question is, following this hypothesis, can the new French president change this pattern of repeated slow failure? Worth a read, if you’re not familiar with the classic US take on the EU.
May 27, 2012
by Nosemonkey
4 Comments
When Declan Ganley first started to appear on the scene with his Libertas party/pressure group a few years back – not to be confused with UKIP defector Robert Kilroy-Silk’s Veritas party – it was all too easy to dismiss it as another rich man’s vanity project.
My problem with it – as detailed back in 2008, when Ganley turned his anti-Lisbon Treaty campaing organisation into a party ahead of the 2009 European Parliament elections – was primarily that its aims were so damned vague that its policies seemed little better than populist platitudes. But as I wrote then, on the whole, I agreed with a lot of what was being said and hoped my suspicions were unfounded:
” I hope I’m being unfair in doubting them. If Libertas is what it professes to be, it could be just the medicine that the EU needs to fix the ongoing stagnation and rot. But when it comes to EU reform organisations, far too many have turned out to be little more than anti-EU talking shops in disguise for me to accept this as face value just yet.”
Since then, Libertas’ failure at the ballot box and Ganley’s continued vocal criticism of almost all things Brussels have made it easier than ever to dismis him as yet another shouty eurosceptic – and it’s not like we’ve had a shortage of these of late. I had him written off as another Open Europe – the pretend think tank whose mission statement about EU reform I actually agree with almost completely, but which in practice works primarily to confirm the prejudices of eurosceptics, not to develop the constructive alternatives to the current EU model it purports to. Where I started off hoping to agree with Ganley, instead I’ve ended up arguing with him on Twitter as if he were an Irish-focused Nigel Farage.
But now Jon Worth – newly able to speak his mind now he’s no longer hoping to get selected for Labour’s European Parliament list for the 2014 EP elections – asks us to think again about Ganley. Give him a second chance. And he makes a good case:
“debate about the future of the EU needs people like Declan Ganley. He advocates radical and uncomfortable reforms of the EU as the only way out of the Eurozone debt crisis. He is neither a pro-European nor a Eurosceptic in the classic sense. He poses complicated questions that urgently need answers, and he’s starting to propose some answers of his own.”
One thing’s for sure, we need some fresh thinking. The faux europhile/europhobe division’s been false for years – and most of the national-level parties and politicians have for too long treated the EU as a sideshow distraction, not worthy of serious thought or attention. Too often they have been happy to use it as a scapegoat or an excuse – and in far too many cases to see it as a threat to their personal political power rather than the promise of a better future for their people that it was always supposed to be.
The reason the EU is in its current mess is thanks to the small-minded unoriginality and self-preservation instincts of its political class. And why? Simple – as Jon found when trying to pander to the powers that be in the Labour party, established political organisations abhor independence of thought and originality of proposed solution. But what they hate more than anything is nuance – the suggestion that there may be shades of grey, that nothing is ever as simple as a yes/no.
We need more nuance in EU debate, and have done for years. Is Ganley the man to bring this forwards? It’s still far too early to say. But I’ll tell you this much – it’s all in the details. Because that’s all the EU is: a collection of details. There hasn’t been an overriding vision for decades – which is precisely how it has become so lost and confused.
All of which could be taken as a mission statement for my return to blogging – more details, more nuance, more challenging of my own prejudices as well as other people’s. That is, after all, why I started this place up all those years ago. Because that’s what the EU debate needs.
Is it time to jump into bed with Ganley? Not quite. But it’s worth serious thought, if only because he’s one of the few involved in EU politics whose views I can’t entirely predict. This is a very refreshing change.